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Stop and Frisk City 
 HOW THE NYPD CAN POLICE ITSELF AND 
IMPROVE A TROUBLED POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”1 The “stop and frisk”2 policy 
employed by the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”)3 
challenges our understanding of those constitutional rights. 
Since 1968, the Supreme Court has condoned the practice 
of stop and frisk.4 But lower courts have “eroded the force” of the 
original Terry standard in such a way that police departments 
have little idea of what a sound stop and frisk policy should look 
like.5 As a result, there are few checks on the tremendous 
discretion given to the NYPD in the stop and frisk context. In 
2012 alone, “New Yorkers were stopped by the police 532,911 
times. 473,644 were totally innocent (89%), 284,229 were Black 
(55%), 165,140 were Latino (32%), [and] 50,366 were White 
(10%).”6 These statistics suggest that some incidents of stop and 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2 “Stop and frisk” is a practice that permits a police officer to stop any 
individual if the officer has reason to believe “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). Further, a police officer may frisk that individual if the 
officer has reason to believe “that the persons with whom [the officer] is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous.” Id. 
 3 The NYPD formally refers to its use of “stop and frisk” as “Stop, Question, 
and Frisk” These two terms are used interchangeably herein. See NYPD, The Stop, 
Question and Frisk, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_
planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 4 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 5 See David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: 
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 975, 976 (1998). 
 6 Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/
content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). For further statistics on stop 
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frisk may be racially motivated.7 By updating the policy that 
controls an individual officer’s discretion and disclosing that policy 
to the public, the NYPD could make a good faith effort to eliminate 
the disparate racial impact that the stop and frisk policy has had in 
New York City. Further, given the recent opinion by U.S. District 
Court Judge Scheindlin that the NYPD’s stop and frisk policies 
“violat[e] the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights,”8 the NYPD should update its stop and frisk policy to limit 
the discretion given to individual officers.9 “[E]xcessive or 
unnecessary discretion can and should be eliminated, 
and . . . necessary discretion should be properly controlled.”10 
To appropriately regulate officer discretion, the NYPD 
should adopt and implement clear police policies and procedures 
so officers can enforce the law without infringing upon citizens’ 
constitutional rights.11 The need for setting clear standards within 
the department is only heightened by the ambiguous standards 
set forth by the courts. The current NYPD stop and frisk 
standard “perpetuates the morally ambiguous nature of police 
work in its literal sense—that which line police officers do.”12 
The consequences of this ambiguity spread throughout the 
entirety of the police force, for if the upper ranks of the NYPD 
are unclear as to how to apply discretion, then it is likely that 
officers implementing the procedures will also be unsure as to 
how to legally utilize stop and frisk discretion. 
The NYPD has stated that the purpose of stop and frisk is 
to reduce crime13 and the number of guns in New York City.14 
 
and frisk in New York City, see Judge Scheindlin’s findings in Floyd v. City of New 
York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
 7 Stop-and-Frisk Campaign: About the Issue, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
http://www.nyclu.org/issues/racial-justice/stop-and-frisk-practices (last visited Sept. 15, 
2013). For further information on Stop and Frisk in New York City, see Judge 
Scheindlin’s findings in Floyd 2013 WL 4046209, at *3-7.  
 8 See Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209; Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 
1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046217 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
 9 See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975). 
 10 Id. at 141 (Though the author does not explicitly address Stop and Frisk in 
his book, the same logic regarding controlled discretion applies to the NYPD’s Stop and 
Frisk policy as well.). 
 11 See generally id. 
 12 GEORGE L. KELLING, “BROKEN WINDOWS” AND POLICE DISCRETION 15 
(1999) (citation omitted). 
 13 See Nate Raymond, Judge Limits “Stop and Frisk” Searches in New York’s 
Bronx, REUTERS, Jan. 8, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/
us-newyork-stopfrisk-ruling-idUSBRE9070SR20130108. 
 14 See Ailsa Chang, Map: NYPD Finds Most Guns Outside Stop-and-Frisk 
Hotspots, WNYC NEWS (July 16, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/
jul/16/wnyc-map-police-find-guns-where-they-stop-and-frisk-less/; see generally NYPD’s 
Stop and Frisk Practice: Unfair and Unjust, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., 
http://ccrjustice.org/stopandfrisk (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). Based on the UF-250 Form 
data, the Center for Constitutional rights determined the following: “In 2011, 88 
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“Reducing crime is a worthy goal, but along with decreases in 
crime may come other, less desirable consequences,” such as due 
process violations.15 The Department’s failure to set forth a clear 
policy has damaged the NYPD’s reputation and could open the city 
up to extensive litigation for violations of constitutional rights.16 
Moreover, given the depressed economy, severe lack of 
resources that plague New York City,17 and recent stop and frisk 
decision in federal court,18 the City and the NYPD must update 
the department’s stop and frisk policies.19 Because “[t]he police 
are among the most important policy-makers of our entire 
society[,] [a]nd . . . make far more discretionary determinations 
in individual cases than any other class of administrators,” the 
NYPD must take the initiative to update its policies.20 
One way for the NYPD to update its stop and frisk 
policy is through the use of internal rulemaking.21 The NYPD 
should adopt rules that include: (1) updating the stop and frisk 
 
percent of all stops did not result in an arrest or a summons being given. Contraband 
was found in only 2 percent of all stops. The NYPD claims their stop and frisk policy 
keeps weapons off the street—but weapons were recovered in only one percent of all 
stops. These numbers clearly contradict that claim.” Id.  
 15 JOHN ETERNO, POLICING WITHIN THE LAW: A CASE STUDY OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 17 (2003). 
 16 “When failing to wrestle with the complex moral and legal issues of social 
policies, departments risk litigation, the outcome of which can seriously jeopardize 
current and future departmental efforts to deal with serious problems.” KELLING, supra 
note 12, at 15 (citations omitted). 
 17 See New Budget Cuts for NYC Agencies, NBC N.Y. (Sept. 14, 2012, 3:42 PM), 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/New-York-City-Budget-Cuts-NYPD-FDNY-
Education-169812076.html (“City agencies must cut spending over the next two years to 
meet a projected $2.5 million budget gap.”). 
 18 Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013); see also Joseph Goldstein, Police Stop-and-Frisk Program in 
Bronx Is Ruled Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/09/nyregion/judge-limits-nypd-stop-and-frisk-program-in-bronx.html. The Second 
Circuit stayed Judge Scheindlin’s order pending the City’s appeal. Jake Pearson, NYC 
Moves to Vacate Judge’s Stop-Frisk Decisions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 1, 2013, 
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_STOP_AND_FRISK?SITE=AP&SECTION=
HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2013-10-31-16-16-00. 
 19 See Henry Goldman, New York City Council Seeks to Limit Police Stop-
and-Frisks, BUS. WK. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/
341450?type=bloomberg (“New York spent $633 million settling and paying judgments 
on thousands of lawsuits alleging police abuse and civil-rights violations from 2006 to 
2011.”); see also NYPD Lawsuits Rise Dramatically; Lawsuits Against New York City 
Cost $550.4 Million in Last Fiscal Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 27, 2012, 12:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/27/nypd-city-lawsuits-rise-70-new-york-city-
resident_n_2370111.html (“In the 2011 fiscal year alone, New York City paid out a 
staggering $550.4 million—or about $70 per New York resident—to settle a litany of 
lawsuits ranging from personal injury claims to medical malpractice. A large chunk of 
that over half a billion dollar figure—a five percent increase over the year before—
stems from lawsuits brought against the New York Police Department. Lawsuits 
against the NYPD cost city taxpayers $185 million, more than any other city agency.”). 
 20 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
222 (1969); see also Goldstein, supra note 18. 
 21 See generally DAVIS, supra note 9. 
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section of the NYPD manual,22 (2) eliminating the quota system,23 
(3) amending the NYPD Unified Form 250 (“UF-250”) that 
officers are required to fill out following any stop and frisk 
encounter,24 (4) increasing the responsibility of middle 
management,25 and (5) revising the reprimand system.26 Using 
proactive administrative tools would allow the NYPD to make 
clear to the public and individual police officers the specific 
purpose of the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy.27 “Proponents of rule 
making assert that in the absence of rule making, subordinates 
at or near the bottom of the organization reformulate and 
refine public policy goals—and that street-level officers make 
policy on the basis of intuition and superficial guesswork rather 
than studies and investigations by qualified specialists.”28 By 
utilizing this opportunity to update its stop and frisk policy, the 
NYPD can limit such sporadic policy making by controlling the 
discretion given to individual officers. Implementing these 
restrictions is important, because “much [of] police policy making 
is of such low visibility that it is exempt from review both within 
and outside the organization.”29 
The NYPD stop and frisk policy must be continually 
addressed for it to stay up-to-date and relevant.30 Because the 
NYPD has received little guidance from the courts prior to 
Floyd v. City of New York in 2013, the police department has 
had tremendous discretion as to how to update its policy.31 
“‘[G]reater participation by the police in the making of rules for 
their own guidance . . . embraces the prospect . . . of progressively 
higher elevations in the quality of police performance . . . .’”32 
 
 22 See infra Part IV.A. 
 23 See infra Part IV.B. 
 24 See infra Part IV.C. 
 25 See infra Part IV.D. 
 26 See infra Part IV.E. 
 27 See generally GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND 
POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 9-10 (Richard A. Brody et al. eds., 1987) 
(citations omitted). 
 28 DAVID E. AARONSON ET AL., PUBLIC POLICY AND POLICE DISCRETION 405 (1984). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See KELLING, supra note 12, at 45 (“Policy development is ongoing. It is a 
repetitive, never-ending aspect of police work. . . . Changing conditions, laws, 
traditions, and standards require continual updating of police guidelines.”). 
 31 See AARONSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 49 (“[P]olice chiefs and their 
administrative staffs have considerable discretion to ‘redefine’ or alter the intent of a 
policy through: (1) their direct access to policy formulators [and] (2) their control over 
the formal networks of organizational communication (e.g., police general orders, 
content of training manuals, reward structure) . . . .”). 
 32 DAVIS, supra note 9, at 125-26 (quoting Judge Carl McGowan, Rule-Making 
and the Police 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 674 (1972)). In fact, Judge Scheindlin is requiring 
the NYPD’s participation in the development of remedies to ensure that its stop and 
frisk policies are constitutional. See generally Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 
1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046217 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
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Therefore, the process of defining the practices and limits of stop 
and frisk should not simply be left to the NYPD’s legal staff. Top 
officials, individual officers, and community members alike need 
to participate in this development to ensure that everyone 
affected understands the updated policy.33 
This note details the history of stop and frisk and 
argues that the NYPD should internally amend its stop and 
frisk policy to better limit the discretion given to individual 
officers. Part I outlines a brief history of stop and frisk. Part II 
examines the inadequacy of the current remedies available to 
those who feel their Fourth Amendment rights have been violated 
by stop and frisk. Part III contends that the NYPD needs to 
update its stop and frisk policy. Finally, Part IV outlines 
administrative solutions the NYPD should implement in order to 
reduce constitutional violations of individual rights. These 
updates are incredibly important both for the NYPD and the 
citizens of New York City, who have increasingly pressured the 
City to change its procedures.34 Given the uproar in New York 
City and around the country over stop and frisk, as well as the 
recent decision declaring the NYPD’s stop and frisk tactics 
unconstitutional, the NYPD should be receptive to updating its 
policy.35 
I. THE HISTORY OF STOP AND FRISK  
Generally, when police officers conduct searches or 
seizures, they must do so with a search warrant, founded on 
probable cause and consisting of the requisite particularity.36 
Stop and frisk, however, has created a major exception to the 
warrant requirement.37 Under stop and frisk, police officers need 
only “specific and articulable facts” to stop an individual.38 
Consequently, by significantly decreasing the standard required by 
the Fourth Amendment from probable cause to reasonableness, the 
 
 33 See generally AARONSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 207; see also Floyd, 2013 
WL 4046217, at *12-14. 
 34 See Goldman, supra note 19. 
 35 Judge Scheindlin’s decision in Floyd v. City of New York requires changes 
to the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy. Though the NYPD has appealed the decision, for 
now, her decision remains the law. See Chris Kokenes & Chelsea J. Carter, New York 
City Appealing Stop-and-Frisk Ruling, CNN (Aug. 16, 2013, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/16/us/ny-stop-and-frisk. 
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 37 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
 38 Id. 
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Supreme Court “radically changed the standard for allowing 
searches and seizures.”39  
The U.S. Supreme Court first authorized this departure 
from the text of the Fourth Amendment when it declared stop 
and frisk constitutional over 40 years ago in Terry v. Ohio.40 In 
its decision, the Court noted that in order for a police officer to 
stop an individual on the street without probable cause, which 
is required under the text of the Fourth Amendment, the officer 
must have reason to believe “in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot.”41 In order to then conduct a 
frisk, it must be apparent that “a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger.”42 The Court, anticipating 
the need to limit the discretion given to individual police officers 
and to give lower courts guidance in their evaluation of police 
discretion, explained that “in determining whether the officer 
acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be 
given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is 
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”43 As a 
result, the Court held: 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing 
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of 
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area 
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in 
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.44 
By outlining such a vague stop and frisk standard, the Court 
significantly reduced the individual protections laid out in the 
Fourth Amendment and simultaneously expanded police power. 
 
 39 Justin S. Conroy, “Show Me Your Papers”: Race and Street Encounters, 19 
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 149, 159 (2005/2006). 
 40 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
 41 Id. at 30. 
 42 Id. at 27. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 30-31. 
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That expansion of police power is furthered by the 
limited role of judicial review in overseeing police conduct. In 
most circumstances, a court could review police officers’ 
administrative decisions . . . for abuse of discretion, which is 
commonly measured by whether officials have (1) considered 
something they should not have considered, (2) not considered 
something they should have considered, (3) given improper weight to 
something they should have considered, or (4) decided without 
sufficient evidence. These criteria suggest both that a court may not 
substitute its own judgment on what the right decision would be for 
that of the official exercising discretion and that the official decision-
maker is subject to a check on the basic fairness and reasonableness 
of the way he or she went about making the decision.45 
Because of the immediacy of decision-making during a 
stop and frisk, however, these commonly considered factors are 
not as applicable.46 While it may be that the Court tried to 
create an applicable standard of review in stop and frisk cases, 
applying the “reasonably prudent” standard47 has proven to be 
difficult for lower courts and police forces alike.48 Moreover, 
because the officer only needs to show that he had a reasonable 
suspicion, judicial review is not the most effective means to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights. 
Indeed, the Court has been unable to create a clear stop 
and frisk standard. On the same day that the Court decided 
Terry, it decided two similar stop and frisk cases—Sibron v. 
New York49 and Peters v. New York50—but came to different 
conclusions in each case. The Court held in Sibron that the 
police violated Sibron’s Fourth Amendment rights by seizing 
drugs on his person without any articulable facts as to why the 
police officer believed he was armed and dangerous.51 The Court 
held differently in Peters and found that the officer had reason to 
believe that Peters was armed and dangerous, thereby permitting 
 
 45 HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 503 (David H. 
Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994). 
 46 It is difficult for courts to review stop and frisk incidents under these 
common factors because of the inherent nature of stops. Stops are intended to occur on 
the move, as a result of an officer’s belief that criminal activity is afoot. The unplanned 
and high-stakes nature of stops, therefore, makes it difficult to apply a common set of 
factors to evaluate an officer’s judgment. Further, because each incident is fact specific, 
with the potential for post hoc rationalizations by officers, judicial review is difficult.  
 47 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 48 See Harris, supra note 5, at 975-76. 
 49 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 50 Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 51 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64; see also Conroy, supra note 39, at 161-62 
(citations omitted). 
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the officer to search Peters for weapons.52 It appears that the 
Court has not yet “develop[ed] a standard that can be consistently 
applied by lower [courts] in stop and frisk cases.”53 
Though the United States Constitution sets the floor for 
individual rights, states may add more protective provisions 
under their individual state constitutions.54 As such, in response 
to the Terry standard, the New York Court of Appeals declared 
its own four-level stop and frisk standard, in hopes of creating 
a clearer guide for both courts and police forces.55 The lowest 
two levels of intrusion which do not reflect standards required 
on the federal level, consist of the following: 
The most minimal police intrusion regulated by the court is a request 
for information, which can involve “basic, nonthreatening questions 
regarding, for instance, identity, address or destination.” To justify this 
conduct, the police must possess “some objective credible reason for [the] 
interference not necessarily indicative of criminality.” The next level of 
police intrusion is a common-law right to inquire. The Court of Appeals 
has determined that police contact ceases being a request for 
information and transforms into a common-law inquiry once an officer 
asks “more pointed questions that would lead the person approached 
reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing 
and is the focus of the officer’s investigation.” In order to conduct the 
common-law right to inquire, the police must have a “founded suspicion 
that criminal activity is afoot.”56 
Levels three and four of the New York stop and frisk 
model reflect the federal constitutional requirements. Under 
“the third level, police may make a ‘forcible stop and detention’ 
of a person when they possess ‘reasonable suspicion that [that] 
 
 52 Peters, 392 U.S. at 66; see also Conroy, supra note 39, at 161-62 
(citations omitted). 
 53 Conroy, supra note 39, at 161-62 (citations omitted). 
 54 Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The 
Aftermath of People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512, 518 (1991). 
 55 See People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). New York later codified these 
standards in its Criminal Procedure Law at CPL § 140.50(1), declaring that: “A police 
officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such 
officer’s employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has 
committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the 
penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his 
conduct.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2010). Moreover, “[w]hen upon 
stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police 
officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of 
physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, 
article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not 
ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or 
instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may 
constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of 
the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest 
such person.” Id. § 140.50(3). 
 56 Priyamvada Sinha, Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional 
Considerations, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 165-66 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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particular person has committed, is committing or is about to 
commit a felony or misdemeanor.’”57 Lastly, under level four 
“an officer may arrest and take into custody a person when he has 
‘probable cause to believe that person has committed a crime, or 
offense in his presence.’”58 Though the New York standard is 
considerably more specific than the federal stop and frisk 
standard, it still allows for a great deal of police discretion.59 
II. INADEQUACY OF REMEDIES FOR STOP AND FRISK 
VIOLATIONS 
By stopping an individual when no justifiable purpose 
exists, police officers violate citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights. Such violations, however, are difficult to prove. Given 
that the nature of stop and frisk does not typically result in “the 
recovery of evidence, and because the qualified immunity 
doctrine shields most police action from scrutiny, few stop and 
frisks are ever reviewed by courts.”60 Further, because these 
encounters are rarely reviewed and the nature of the encounters 
reflects a quick and ongoing exchange with likely limited 
witnesses, abuse of police discretion in stop and frisks is rarely 
discovered.61 The NYPD has adopted a number of policies in an 
attempt to control abuse of citizens’ constitutional rights, but 
most of these procedures are inadequate. 
A. UF-250 Forms 
According to NYPD policy, when a police officer has 
conducted a stop and frisk, he or she is required to complete a UF-
250 Form.62 The UF-250 Form requires an officer to detail “the 
timing and location of the stop, descriptive and identifying 
characteristics of the person stopped, the reason for the stop, 
whether the person was frisked, and whether the person was 
 
 57 Sack, supra note 54, at 522 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 58 Id. 
 59 See ETERNO, supra note 15, at 62 (quoting JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, 
GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 40-41 (1996) (“The problem is, the law is 
so muddy that the police can’t find out what they are allowed to do even if they wanted 
to. If a street cop took a sabbatical and holed himself up in a library for six months 
doing nothing but studying the law on search and seizure, he wouldn’t know any more 
than he did before he started. The law is totally confusing, yet we expect cops to always 
know at every moment what the proper action is.”)). 
 60 See Dasha Kabakova, The Lack of Accountability for the new York Police 
Department’s Investigative Stops, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 539, 574 (2012). 
 61 See Sack, supra note 54, at 513. 
 62 Id. 547-48. 
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issued a summons or arrested.”63 A supervisor then reviews the 
details.64 
The form is problematic for a number of reasons, 
including the opportunity, after the incident occurred, for an 
officer to create justifiable reasons for a stop. Because the form 
consists of boxes for an officer to check that could justify the 
stop, the form has taken the accountability away from the 
officer. Theoretically, an officer is supposed to detail his or her 
reasons for stopping an individual. “In practice, however, officers 
do not in fact record the factors justifying a stop . . . and 
supervisors do not address this deficiency.”65 
B. State and Federal Civil Rights Actions 
Recently the New York City Council attempted to right 
the wrongs in the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy by passing a bill 
that “expand[s] New Yorkers’ ability to sue over racial profiling 
by officers.”66 This bill, Introduction Number 1080, adds “age, 
gender, housing status and sexual orientation” to “the definition 
of bias-based profiling.”67 This bill, therefore, “allow[s] 
individuals to sue the Police Department in state court . . . for 
policies that disproportionately affect people in any protected 
categories without serving a significant law enforcement goal.”68 
Additionally, those “[i]ndividuals who are arrested and whose 
criminal charges are later dismissed, as well as those who are 
stopped but not arrested, [can seek monetary damages by 
suing] the NYPD [in federal court] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violations of their federal civil rights.”69  
But there is no certainty that litigation would have a 
significant impact in remedying these issues.70 Plaintiffs in stop 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Once the supervisor reviews the UF-250 Form, it is “entered into a log in 
the precinct station house and assigned a serial number. Later, the data from the form 
are entered into the computerized database by an officer assigned to administrative 
duties or by a civilian precinct employee.” Id. at 548. 
 65 Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at 
*37 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). In Judge Scheindlin’s recent opinion, she found “that the 
NYPD has no meaningful procedures for auditing stop paperwork to monitor the 
constitutionality of stops.” Id. at *38.  
 66 J. David Goodman, City Council Votes to Increase Oversight of New York 
Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/nyregion/new-
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 67 Id; N.Y.C. Council 1080-2013 (N.Y.C. 2013). 
 68 Goodman, supra note 66. 
 69 Kabakova, supra note 60, at 551; see generally Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209. 
 70 Though the appeal in this case is pending, Judge Scheindlin recently found 
that the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy was unconstitutional as it applied to a number of 
plaintiffs. See generally Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209. This ruling lends itself to the idea 
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and frisk lawsuits could face evidentiary challenges, such as 
gaining access to the limited paperwork detailing the stops and an 
officer’s justification for the stop or the inability to locate witnesses, 
should there be any.71 Moreover, monetary damages could be 
limited for those whose rights are violated by an improper stop and 
frisk, but suffered no significant injuries or losses. 
C. The Exclusionary Rule 
Violations of the Fourth Amendment are generally 
checked by the exclusionary rule, which “simply stated, 
prevents illegally obtained evidence from being used in court 
proceedings against a defendant.”72 Given the infrequency of 
meaningful judicial review of stop and frisk procedures, 
however, the exclusionary rule does not often apply.73 Because 
the majority of stop and frisks do not reveal contraband or 
criminal activity, there is simply no evidence to exclude, nor a 
trial from which to exclude it. 
Further, even if a judge reviewed a stop and frisk and 
suppressed the evidence that was obtained during the 
encounter, the individual officer who conducted the stop may 
never know the outcome of the case or why the evidence was 
suppressed.74 As a result, an individual officer may never learn 
from his or her abuse of discretion.75 Consequently, not only does 
the exclusionary rule have an insignificant effect on an officer, 
but it also has an insignificant effect on “[p]olice departments [as 
they] have little incentive [to] discipline officers when evidence 
is suppressed because it is easy to write off a few lost 
prosecutions . . . .”76 This leaves individuals whose rights were 
violated by an unjustifiable stop and frisk without any real 
recourse, for any action they take has little impact on the stop 
and frisk policy or the officers themselves.77 
 
that if the NYPD does not engage in efforts to update its policy soon, it might be 
updated for them. See Goldstein, supra note 18. 
 71  See supra Part II (introductory paragraph). 
 72 ETERNO, supra note 15, at 5. 
 73 Kabakova, supra note 60, at 549. 
 74 Judge Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 
673 (1972).  
 75 Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case 
Study of How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See McGowan, supra note 74, at 673.  
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D. The CCRB  
Individuals may seek administrative review of police 
action by filing a complaint with either “the Civilian Complaint 
Review Board (CCRB), an independent agency . . . [or] the 
Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) of the NYPD.”78 The CCRB and 
the IAB “have different jurisdiction[s]. The CCRB investigates 
complaints of ‘excessive or unnecessary use of force, abuse of 
authority, discourtesy, and offensive language,’ while the IAB 
handles complaints of corruption.”79 Though these review boards 
were based on sound intentions, they have proven to be relatively 
futile in remedying violations of the Fourth Amendment.80 
The CCRB has not been effective in disciplining 
individual police officers, because the Board’s resources to 
review complaints and conduct research for bettering stop and 
frisk policy are scarce.81 First, “[t]he CCRB’s investigations are 
handled by more than 140 civilian investigators and are reviewed 
by panels of a 13-member board comprised of mayoral designees, 
city council designees, and police commissioner designees.”82 The 
board, empowered by the New York City charter, can “‘receive, 
investigate, hear, make findings and recommend action upon 
complaints by members of the public against members of the 
police department that allege misconduct involving excessive use 
of force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or use of offensive 
language.’”83 Second, though the CCRB serves a legitimate need, its 
staff consists of solely civilians, who hold no disciplinary power.84 
“[T]he ultimate disciplinary power remains with the police chief 
executive. Civilian review procedures [only] have the power to 
recommend disciplinary action.”85 As a result, the CCRB can only 
be effective if the chief executive chooses to implement the review 
board’s recommendations.86 Because of its limited resources, the 
CCRB has been forced to abandon its policy efforts because of their 
 
 78 Kabakova, supra note 60 at 555 (internal citations omitted).  
 79 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 80 See Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209, at 
*44 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (“The DAO’s frequent rejection of the CCRB’s disciplinary 
recommendations has likely undermined public confidence in the CCRB and discouraged 
the filing of complaints—many of which may have been meritorious.”). For further 
discussion on the NYPD reprimand system, see Floyd, 2013 WL 4046209, at *42-44. 
 81 See Clarke, supra note 75, at 30-38. 
 82 Kabakova, supra note 60, at 556 (internal citations omitted). 
 83 N.Y.C., N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 18-A, § 440(c)(1) (2009). 
 84 See generally Clarke, supra note 75. 
 85 Samuel Walker & Vic W. Bumphus, The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: 
Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of the 
Police, in LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT 363, 379 (Marilyn 
McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1997) (citations omitted). 
 86 Id. 
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limited resources.87 As a result, “[t]he CCRB[] . . . gradually 
transformed . . . into an agency that investigates fewer complaints 
and is more deferential to the police.”88 
Because the CCRB lacks any disciplinary power, it is 
rare for an officer to suffer any sort of strict punishment due to 
stop and frisk complaints.89 Consequently, these measures have 
little deterrent effect on officers.90 In fact, police officers who 
are punished as a result of a review of their stop and frisk 
complaint often receive instructions from a commanding officer 
about the flaws in the subject officer’s conduct, and what the 
proper conduct should have been in the given circumstance.91 
Alternatively, if a commanding officer sees fit, the subject officer 
could be required to undergo further training at the Police 
Academy.92 While instructions may be useful in allowing the 
officer to learn, such a remedy is insufficient to remedy this 
department-wide issue. 
In response to perceived stop and frisk abuse and because 
of the concern over the lack of oversight of the NYPD, the New 
York City Council proposed a bill that would “create an 
independent inspector general to monitor and review police policy, 
conduct investigations and recommend changes to the 
department.”93 But the same issue that plagues the CCRB would 
similarly affect the inspector general: the inability to implement 
any of the recommendations suggested to the NYPD.94 
III. WHY THE NYPD SHOULD IMPLEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE 
SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS 
In the absence of effective external checks on police stop 
and frisk practices, the NYPD must develop and implement its 
own internal policies to guide individual officers on how to 
handle stop and frisk situations. Recently, the NYPD has taken 
 
 87 Id. at 34. 
 88 Id. at 37. 
 89 See McGowan, supra note 74, at 673.  
 90 Clarke, supra note 75, at 7 (citations omitted). 
 91 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Goodman, supra note 75; N.Y.C. Council 1079, 2013 (N.Y.C. 2013). 
 94 Michael Howard Saul, How the NYPD Monitor and Likely IG Will Handle 
Stop-and-Frisk, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/
2013/08/14/how-the-nypd-monitor-and-likely-ig-will-handle-stop-and-frisk/. In addition 
to the independent inspector general, Judge Scheindlin has appointed an independent 
monitor to oversee the implementation of her remedies. See Floyd v. City of New York, 
No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046217, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
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steps to update its teaching policies.95 For instance, during 
training, officers act out hypothetical scenarios and then 
immediately get feedback from their police instructors about 
their use of police discretion in light of NYPD guidelines.96 
Though it appears these updated teaching policies are 
contributing to a reduction in the number of stop and frisks in 
New York,97 the policies alone are not enough. “Police 
discretion can best be structured and controlled through the 
process of administrative rule-making by police agencies. 
Police administrators should, therefore, give the highest 
priority to the formulation of administrative rules governing 
the exercise of discretion . . . .”98 Officers need guidelines to 
which they can continually refer, such as an updated policy 
that will predictably and consistently guide them when they 
are out in the field protecting the citizenry.99 
[W]hen laws are written unclearly, officers are influenced by that 
ambiguity. Slight ambiguity in laws is used by officers to their 
advantage, meaning more officers will search and/or stop in mildly 
ambiguous legal situations. When the law is extremely 
ambiguous . . . it appears that officers will stretch the law to its very 
limits, taking advantage of every bit of ambiguity left to them.100 
Given the recent federal court decision regarding the 
NYPD’s stop and frisk procedures, the NYPD must reevaluate 
its current policies.101 Furthermore, the NYPD should disclose its 
policy to the public, because “(1) [a]ny public agency, because it 
is a public agency, should make its policies known [and] (2) 
[f]airness requires that those affected have a chance to know 
the enforcement policies.”102 
Additionally, the NYPD will be better served with a 
proactive policy rather than solely relying on a reactive review 
board like the CCRB. However, “the challenge is not to choose, 
but to balance and integrate the competing demands of 
 
 95 Jill Colvin, Inside the NYPD’s New Stop-and-Frisk Training, DNA INFO 
(June 21, 2012, 8:01AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20120621/city-island/
inside-nypds-new-stop-and-frisk-training. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Joseph Goldstein & Wendy Ruderman, Street Stops in New York Fall as 
Unease Over Tactic Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/
04/nyregion/number-of-police-street-stops-falls-34-percent.html. 
 98 DAVIS, supra note 9, at 100-01 (citation omitted). 
 99 For further discussion on the need for updated training, see Floyd v. City of 
New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046217, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013). 
 100 ETERNO, supra note 15, at 101. 
 101 See generally Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 
4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013); Floyd, 2013 WL 4046217; see also Goldman, supra note 19. 
 102 DAVIS, supra note 9, at 71. 
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different police functions.”103 Therefore, though administrative 
tools do not suffice as an alternative to the judicially implemented 
exclusionary rule, administrative policies are sound supplemental 
procedures.104 As previously noted, the majority of the 
repercussions on individual officers consists solely of 
instructions.105 Given the expertise of the NYPD and its legal 
staff, it is far more useful to employ the tools the NYPD already 
has at its disposal to create a new proactive approach. 
Police department “[m]anagement devotes its time to 
responding to economic and political elites, overseeing budgets, 
setting broad policy priorities, creating performance measures, 
and resolving other issues related to supervision.”106 The NYPD 
is no different. While the NYPD surely strives to decrease crime 
and to protect the general public, it could do more to limit abuse 
of discretion and better inform its officers about the 
consequences of such abuse.107 This is certainly no easy task, for 
“[s]treet-level bureaucrats, such as police officers, must cope 
with both management’s directives concerning a legal policy and 
the immediate pressures generated on the street.”108 
An updated policy would address these problems, because 
the NYPD can “explicitly authorize discretion” in stop and frisk 
situations.109 “Such continued restatements are important, despite 
their redundancy, because citizens, prosecutors, courts, lawyers, 
and legislatures must clearly understand that the issue is not 
whether police officers use discretion. The real questions are how 
officers use discretion and how their use of it is shaped.”110 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE VIOLATIONS OF 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY  
In evaluating and promoting general updated policies, the 
National Institute of Justice, a research and development agency 
within the Department of Justice, set forth a number of principles 
that should be considered in “develop[ing] and implement[ing] 
policies”111: 
 
 103 Malcolm K. Sparrow, Integrating Distinct Managerial Styles: The 
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Recognize the complexity of police work[;] [a]cknowledge that police 
will use discretion[;] [r]ecognize and confirm how police work is 
conducted[;] [a]dvance a set of values that may be applied to the 
substantive work issue at hand[;] [p]ut forward existing research, 
facts, or data about the substantive issue at hand[;] [u]ndergo 
development by practicing police officers and citizens[;] [u]ndergo public 
promulgation in a manner clear to officers, the general public, community 
stakeholders, and the courts[;] [i]nclude rules about what officers should 
not do[;] [e]mphasize police adherence to a process (application of 
knowledge, skills, and values), rather than any predictable outcome, 
because outcomes of police interventions are often wildly unpredictable 
regardless of officers’ skills, intent, and values[;] [e]stablish accountability 
standards that identify component and/or excellent performance, 
violations of organizational rules, and incompetent or uncaring work, 
including performance within organizational rules[;] [r]eceive recognition 
as an ongoing continuing process.112 
All of these principles are important and further 
highlight the need for experienced officers, new officers, 
lawyers, politicians, and members of the community to work 
together to come up with a stop and frisk policy that is useful for 
officers and simultaneously protects individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.113 “A police rulemaking process that involves 
supervisors and line officers as well as higher-level 
administrators and legal counsel is clearly more open than a 
process in which rule formulation is accomplished by 
administrators and legal counsel alone.”114 As long as stop and 
frisk is legal, continuous updating of administrative policies is the 
best solution because officers can more easily understand 
administrative rules as opposed to court decisions.115 
A. Update the NYPD Manual 
As it stands today, individual officers are provided with a 
vague police manual. The Police Manual dictates the following 
procedure in conducting a stop and frisk: 
When a uniformed member of the service reasonably suspects a 
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony 
or a Penal Law misdemeanor: 1. Stop a person and request 
identification and explanation of conduct . . . . [However,] [i]f not in 
uniform, identify yourself as a police officer[;] 2. Frisk, if you 
reasonably suspect you or others are in danger of physical injury[;] 3. 
Search, if frisk reveals object which may be a weapon [(]NOTE: Only 
that portion of the suspect’s clothing where object was felt may be 
 
 112 Id. 
 113 See generally AARONSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 207; see also McGowan, 
supra note 74, at 674.  
 114 AARONSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 425. 
 115 Id. at 407. 
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searched[);] 4. Detain suspect while conducting investigation to 
determine whether there is probable cause to make an arrest.116 
The NYPD can better regulate officer discretion by 
updating the stop and frisk section of the NYPD Manual, which 
guides officers throughout their duties.117 Moreover, it is 
imperative that the NYPD also instruct each officer on the limits 
of discretion within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.118  
To effect change, NYPD leaders must declare a clear goal 
for stop and frisk.119 Merely identifying a vague goal, such as the 
desire to deter crime or reduce the number of guns on New York 
City streets, is insufficient.120 Identifying goals is essential for the 
successful application of any updated policy.121 As such, it is 
imperative to be specific, rather than merely set forth the standard 
“reduce crime” mantra.122 “There is a need for a deeper 
understanding of how goals are adjusted and refined in the 
implementation stage, and how conflicting organizational and self-
interest goals place limits on achieving public policy goals.”123 If the 
NYPD can incorporate its new goals into both the teaching policy 
as well as the patrol guide, individual officers will be better 
informed and prepared as they conduct their assignments.124 
While the exercise of street-level discretion appears upon superficial 
inspection to be an individualistic process, closer analysis suggests that 
discretion is not exercised in a random fashion. It is possible to identify 
factors that prompt shared responses to particular legal norms. These 
discretionary factors range from the cues police officers receive from the 
management level concerning the implementation of a particular norm, 
such as police orders and special training, to how a particular legal 
norm fits with officers’ conceptualization of their job.125 
Currently, the Patrol Guide attempts to shed light on the 
vague court-determined standard of “reasonableness”126 by setting 
forth the following criteria that factor into reasonable suspicion: 
 
 116 N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD PATROL GUIDE 212-11 (2003). 
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 120 See New Stop-and-Frisk Data: NYPD’s Controversial Policing Tactic Is on 
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927727/new_stop-and-frisk_data%3A_nypd’s_controversial_policing_tactic_is_on_the_
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[t]he demeanor of the suspect[;] [t]he gait and manner of the 
suspect[;] [a]ny knowledge the officer may have of the suspect’s 
background and character[;] [w]hether the suspect is carrying 
anything and what he is carrying[;] [m]anner of dress of suspect 
including bulges in clothing[;] [t]ime of day or night[;] [a]ny 
overheard conversation of the suspect[;] [t]he particular streets and 
areas involved[;] [a]ny information received from third parties[;] 
[p]roximity to scene of crime.127 
Though these factors are helpful, they are not enough to 
overcome the abuse of discretion that results from officers 
trying to achieve a quota, a requirement that officers stop a 
certain number of individuals.128 Further, while these factors 
shed some light on “reasonableness,” they do not paint a full 
picture of what constitutes a reasonable stop.  
Because of the vagaries of the standards set forth in the 
Patrol Guide do not adequately guide officer behavior, the NYPD 
should update its police policies by clearly identifying its specific 
goals in the manual.129 Though it is not possible to predict all of the 
“reasonable” purposes that an officer may have to stop an 
individual, it would be useful to include examples of both proper 
and improper stop and frisk scenarios in the manual. This change 
will help to instruct the officers in specific circumstances and to 
further emphasize that abuse of discretion will not be tolerated. 
B. Eliminate the Quota System 
The NYPD should eliminate the quota system, which 
encourages officers and precincts to stop and frisk a minimum 
number of New Yorkers.130 Whether or not the quota system is 
part of a written policy, it is well understood throughout the 
ranks of the NYPD.131 This is problematic for many reasons. 
[I]n a crime control environment, the pressure on police officers of 
every rank is to reduce the number of reported crimes. This pressure 
may ultimately manifest itself as overzealous enforcement behavior. 
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That is, some officers could be reacting to the unyielding stress to 
reduce crime by abusing their authority (e.g., conducting illegal 
searches, stops, arrests).132 
This quota requirement may encourage officers to stop 
people that the officer does not reasonably suspect to have 
committed a crime.133 Additionally, the quota requirement 
suggests to officers that not only is it okay for them to violate a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights,134 but that this kind of 
flagrant violation is condoned by the police department.135 “This 
abuse of authority is the antithesis of policing in a democracy.”136 
While the Police Commissioner may not be personally 
encouraging individual officers to violate Fourth Amendment 
rights, a message from NYPD headquarters to individual officers 
to stop a certain number of people can certainly be 
misunderstood.137 “[S]treet-level bureaucrats and administrators 
use their discretionary powers differently because the former 
must face the day-to-day demands and needs of the citizenry.”138 
Therefore, “legal policies are implemented” when officers 
interact with New York City residents, whether it be in 
responding to emergency situations or conducting stop and 
frisks.139 When the NYPD sets forth a policy to stop a certain 
number of New Yorkers, not based on reasonable suspicion, but 
rather on strict adherence to numbers,140 the ordinary demands 
on individual officers are left to the wayside. 
C. Amend the UF-250 Form 
Further, the NYPD should amend its UF-250 Form, as 
it promotes complacency and the potential to fabricate post hoc 
justification for stops where no justification existed. By 
amending the UF-250 Form, each officer would be required to 
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provide each and every relevant detail as to why the officer 
concluded that a stop and possibly a frisk141 was reasonable and 
necessary.142 Though it may take more time than the current 
practice, which requires police officers to merely check off boxes 
such as “citizen had suspicious bulge,” it is more important to 
take the time to actively provide supporting details. The 
officer’s immediate supervisor would then review the form with 
the officer to determine what exactly led the officer to 
reasonably suspect the individual was in some way threatening 
the officer or others’ safety.143 “There is something about the 
very process of having to write down on paper detailed 
guidelines for one’s conduct which summons rationality and 
elevates principle.”144 
As described above, discretion can be controlled by 
frequent conversations and interactions with a supervisor.145 
“[P]olice patrol work usually ensures a high level of peer 
interaction and dependency. Partners are influenced by one 
another and the attitudes of rookie police officers are viewed as 
being significantly shaped by the beliefs of veteran officers.”146 
D. Increase the Responsibility of the Middle Management 
An additional solution to address the disconnect 
between the means and purposes of the NYPD stop and frisk 
model is to give middle management more responsibility.147 
“The police rank structure, like all tall rank structures, was 
created in order to enable large tasks to be broken down into 
smaller pieces, through several intermediate stages of 
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aggregation.”148 By putting more responsibility on line officers’ 
supervisors, individual officers will be held more accountable 
for any abuse of discretion.149 Because “[s]o little police work is 
conducted under the eye of supervisors, . . . the only way to 
oversee most routine police work is for officers to talk about 
their work with their superiors.”150 It is particularly important 
to encourage this step because “[o]ne supposedly powerful 
influence on officers’ behavior is supervisory messages.”151 
Moreover, by requiring NYPD middle management to be 
more active in guiding and supervising individual officers, the 
updated stop and frisk policy will become streamlined throughout 
all of the ranks of the NYPD.152 “Because . . . police officers deal 
directly with citizens in relative autonomy of organizational 
managers, they . . . have considerable administrative flexibility or 
discretion to influence legal policy.”153 If all members on all levels 
of the NYPD, however, feel a sense of responsibility with respect 
to the use of their discretion not only to protect citizens and to 
decrease crime, but also to do so in accordance with the 
Constitution, individual officer discretion can be controlled and 
individual rights can be preserved. 
By creating more regular and apparent supervision, 
policy decisions will be made and, consequently, standards will 
be set by the higher ranks of the NYPD, rather than by 
individual officers.154 Thus, putting the responsibility on those 
higher ranking officers will encourage the creation of clear and 
straightforward rules outlining the purpose of stop and frisk, 
detailed examples of successful and unsuccessful uses of police 
discretion, as well as the constitutional ramifications for violations 
of the Fourth Amendment. This will help every member of the 
NYPD, from line officer to Commissioner.155 Additionally, when law 
enforcement agencies are proactive about rulemaking, it leads to 
“more effective and responsive law enforcement, minimization of 
procedural errors, the centralization of accountability, improved 
community relations, and uniformity of policy.”156 
Despite this need for more controlled discretion and 
routine supervision, individual officers cannot and should not 
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be supervised at all times.157 Consequently, there is an 
overwhelming need for “[g]ood policy statements . . . [that] 
provide the language that officers [can] use to describe their 
work for both development of ongoing police knowledge and 
supervisory purposes.”158 By creating a clearly defined 
procedure and incorporating strict supervisory oversight, the 
NYPD will decrease the occurrence of individual officers 
making decisions based on personal agendas and beliefs, and 
could reduce the number of unwarranted stops and frisks.159 
E. Revise the Reprimand System 
Because even the best-intentioned policies are 
insufficient without some means of enforcing them, the NYPD 
needs to create a more effective reprimand system for those 
officers who abuse their discretion.160 As noted above, an officer 
may never become aware of the results of stop and frisk abuse 
under the current procedure because the exclusionary rule may 
not affect an officer’s case until many months after an 
incident.161 Additionally, the CCRB is not sufficient, given that 
the Police Commissioner has the sole power to accept or deny 
the CCRB’s recommendations and reprimand any behavior as 
he sees fit.162 This only furthers the concern that an individual 
officer will not learn from and will not be disciplined for his or 
her abuse of discretion, as it is highly unlikely that the Police 
Commissioner will hear about or feel the need to address every 
instance of discretionary abuse. Currently, if an officer is to be 
actually reprimanded for an abuse of discretion in a stop and frisk 
encounter, the officer will likely, at most, receive “instructions” as 
to why the decision was incorrect and perhaps some suggestions 
for future encounters.163 This kind of reprimand is inadequate, 
given the existence of the quota requirement. Merely being told 
that behavior is wrong would likely not motivate an officer to 
change his behavior. 
The NYPD will be well-served if it were to implement a 
detailed incentive and sanction program, for “rule making must 
be supported by reinforcement devices—a system of incentives 
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and sanctions—if public policy goals are to be served by 
administrative rules for the police.”164 In designing a similar 
model of incentives and sanctions, the Police Executive 
Research Forum set forth the following hierarchy of penalties: 
“(1) counseling; (2) verbal reprimand; (3) letter of reprimand; (4) 
loss of vacation time; (5) imposition of extra duty; (6) monetary 
fine; (7) transfer; (8) suspension without pay; (9) loss of promotion 
opportunity; (10) demotion; (11) discharge from employment; and 
(12) criminal prosecution.”165 Creating incentives and sanctions 
may be the most challenging task for the NYPD to tackle, because 
the police have few limitations on their discretion.166 But with an 
updated policy that details the goals and examples of proper 
discretion in a stop and frisk setting, the NYPD should be able 
to create a more distinct bright-line rule and, as a result, clear 
incentives and sanctions. 
If the NYPD adopts a stricter model regarding police 
discretion, it would be unfair to immediately implement 
penalties six through twelve, noted above. The NYPD could, 
however, implement the lower-numbered penalties, such as 
assigning an officer to desk duty for an extended period of time 
if counseling, verbal reprimand, or letters of reprimand do not 
work and the officer were a repeat offender of the policies. 
Though sanctions are not the ideal solution to this problem, it 
is important that “[s]anctions are imposed frequently enough to 
establish credibility of the threat, but . . . withheld as long as 
violators work hard at coming into compliance.”167 
A hierarchy of incentives could work in a similar 
fashion. When giving incentives, however, it is important to set 
the bar high, for the NYPD would be sending the wrong 
message if it were to reward an officer for merely doing his or 
her job properly. Thus, the NYPD could reward officers with 
praise and recognition from a supervisor for not only 
continuously displaying appropriate use of police discretion in 
stop and frisk procedures, but also for setting an example 
within the police command. “When the behavior elicits both 
recognition by the officer’s supervisors and the approval of his 
or her peer group, the motivational force is likely to be very 
strong, and the behavior will be doubly reinforced.”168 
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In order for an incentive and sanction-based policy to 
serve its purpose, however, “several factors must usually be 
present[:] . . . (1) [t]he person usually must be aware of the 
purpose of the program; (2) the person must know how the 
program will apply to him or her; and, (3) the person must 
desire to accomplish the goals established by the program.”169 
This can be achieved by creating a clear policy, not based on 
quotas, that is enforced throughout all ranks of the NYPD. If 
such a policy is adopted, there will be 
less reluctance by command authorities to punish infractions of rules 
formulated by those authorities themselves as compared with standards 
imposed [by the court]. More effective departmental discipline, along 
with the transfer of policy-making responsibilities to the upper levels of 
police leadership, should also contribute to the realization of a greater 
degree of uniformity in law enforcement practices . . . .170 
CONCLUSION 
Given the significant number of New Yorkers affected 
by the NYPD stop and frisk program,171 as well as the recent 
decision in federal court related to NYPD stop and frisk 
practices,172 the NYPD must update its policies.173 Though NYPD 
policy does not have the “force of law,” Kenneth Culp Davis, an 
expert in the field of administrative law, “has concluded that the 
police do have rule-making powers and that the rules on 
enforcement policy are legal and constitutional . . . .”174 In fact, 
Davis opines: “[W]hile not controlling upon the courts, the courts 
would probably treat the rules at least as ‘interpretive 
regulations’ that ‘constitute a body of experience resulting from 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance.’”175 The effects of an updated NYPD stop and 
frisk policy could be astounding, given the impact that an updated 
policy could have not only on the NYPD, but also on the legal 
system.176 By accepting the NYPD standards, the court as well as 
individual line officers could have a better understanding of how 
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to apply the “reasonable police officer” standard that has 
remained unclear since its creation in Terry177 and De Bour.178 
The NYPD can utilize different administrative rule-making 
tactics to limit individual officer discretion and thereby refocus and 
update its current stop and frisk policy.179 Discretion is essential for 
the NYPD’s daily functioning, but that discretion should be 
controlled.180 “Bureaucratic discretion is an inescapable 
characteristic of the administrative process. It cannot be 
eliminated, but it can be balanced more effectively with our other 
expectations of the exercise of administrative power.”181 By utilizing 
this discretion as a whole and revamping its current stop and frisk 
procedure, instead of deferring to individual officers, the NYPD 
“can reduce injustice by cutting out unnecessary discretion, which 
is one of the prime sources of injustice . . . . Officers should not have 
power to determine in each case in accordance with their 
momentary whims what overall policy they prefer.”182 
Updating the NYPD stop and frisk policy with 
administrative rules will help constructively limit the ability of 
individual officers to make policy decisions.183 Doing so will give 
New Yorkers confidence that their Fourth Amendment rights are 
respected and that the City is making strides to ensure that those 
rights are protected. The NYPD should implement administrative 
rules, such as updating the stop and frisk section of the NYPD 
manual, eliminating the quota system, increasing the 
responsibility of middle management, amending the UF-250 Form, 
and revising the reprimand system.184 Updating the stop and frisk 
policy will create a more straightforward system that will not only 
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